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I. INTRODUCTION
Securities sold exclusively to nonresident aliens in compliance
with Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) administrative guide-
lines' are exempt from registration2 under the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended (Securities Act).3 Despite this exemption, the antifraud pro-
visions4 of the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended (Exchange Act)5 may apply.' These provisions apply ex-
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writings have benefitted the author, and all other members of the securities profession.
** The author wishes to express his gratitude to Keith Ashmus and Jeffrey Vinnik for
their incisive comments regarding this article.
Copyright © 1984 by Marc H. Morgenstern.
1. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4708, 29 Fed. Reg. 9828 (1964).
2. An offering sold exclusively to foreign investors is exempt from registration with the
SEC. For an analysis of the administrative release and no-action letters delineating the
mechanics of qualifying for the exemption see Morgenstern, Real Estate Securities and the
Foreign Investor--Some Problems and a Proposal, II SEC. REG. LJ. 332 (1984).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1982).
4. The primary antifraud provisions are those of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78(j) (1982); and rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-78kk.
6. Much has been written about the extraterritorial application of the securities laws.
See, eg., Hacker & Rotunda, The Extraterritorial Resgulation of Foreign Business Under the
U.S. Securities Laws, 59 N.C.L. REV. 643 (1981); Johnson,Application of Federal Securities
Laws to International Securities Transactions, 45 ALB. L REv. 890 (1981); Loomis & Grant,
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Financial Institutions Outside the U.S. and
Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, I J. COMP. CORP. L. SEC. REG. 3
(1978); Mizrack, Recent Developments in the Extraterritorial Application of Section 10b) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 30 Bus. LAW 367 (1975); Sandberg, The Extraterri-
toral Reach of American Economic Regulation:z The Case of Securities Law, 17 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 315 (1976); Comment, Offshore Mutual Funds: ExtraterritorialApplication of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 13 B.C. INDUS. & Cost. L. REv. 1225 (1972); Note, Extraterrito-
rial Application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 69 COLUM. L REv. 94 (1969); Note,
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traterritorially only when United States courts have subject matter ju-
risdiction7 over the transaction under principles of international law.8
Jurisdiction--Extraterritorial Application of United States Securities Laws, 10 COLUM. J,
TRANSNA'L L. 150 (1971); Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the Anti-Fraud Provi-
sions ofthe Securities Acts, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 137 (1978); Note, American Adjudication
ofTransnational Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1976); Note, ExtraterritorialAppli.
cation ofthe Federal Securities Laws: The Needfor Reassessment, 14 J. INT'L L. & EcoN,
529 (1980); Note, The International Character ofSecurities Credit.- 4 Regulatory Problem, 2
LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 147 (1970); Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Se-
curities Laws, 42 Mo. L. REv. 158 (1977); Comment, An Interest AnalysisApproach to Extra.
territorial Application of Rule 10b-5, 52 TEx. L. Rav. 983 (1974); Comment, The
TransnationalReach o/Rule 10b-5, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1363 (1973); Note, Securities Regula.
tion-Transnational Reach of Federal Securities Laws-Federal Courts Lack Jurisdiction
Over Rule lob-5 Claims Brought by Foreigner Where the Alleged Deception Occurs Abroad,
19 VA. J. INT'L L. 935 (1979); Comment, Extraterritorial Effect othe Registration Require.
ments ofthe Securities Act o1933, 24 VILL. L. REV. 729 (1979); Extraterritorial Application
ofthe Securities Acts, 1974 WASH. U. L.Q. 859.
For articles discussing the extraterritorial application of the federal securities laws
under the proposed Federal Securities Code see Buschman, Antffraud and the Water's Edge.
Transnational Transactions Rule 10b-5, and the Federal Securities Code, 7 SEc. REo. L.J. 232
(1979); Curtis, The Extraterritorial Application of the Federal Securities Code. A Further
Analysis, 9 CONN. L. REv. 67 (1976); Karmel, The ExtraterritorialApplication ofthe Federal
Securities Code, 7 CONN. L. REv. 669 (1975); Lifton, The Extraterritorial Reach ofthe Fed.
eral Securities Code: An Analysis ofSection 1905, 32 VAND. L. REV. 495 (1979); Loss, Extra-
territoriality in the Federal Securities Code, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 305 (1979); and Note,
Extraterritorial Application ofthe Federal Securities Code: An Examination ofthe Role of
International Law in American Courts, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 711 (1978).
7. In addition to subject matter jurisdiction, the United States must have in personam
jurisdiction over the defendants, an issue not addressed in this Article. For cases dealing
with the sensitive issues of personal jurisdiction in the context of an international transac-
tion, see Garner v. Enright, 71 F.R.D. 656 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), Wagman v. Astle, 380 F, Supp,
497 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Pa. 1972), and
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1339-44 (2d Cir. 1972).
8. See Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (when an order was placed
and payment received in Canada for stock of a Canadian corporation traded on the Toronto
Stock Exchange, incidental use of United States mail and telephone did not give a United
States court jurisdiction over alleged violations of section 7(c) of the Exchange Act or Regu-
lation T of the Federal Reserve Board rules); Wagman v. Astle, 380 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (no jurisdiction to recover short-swing profits under section 16(b) of the Exchange Act
where Canadian defendants traded in Canadian securities on Canadian exchanges and in
private Canadian sales and the transaction had no foreseeable effect on protected United
States interests); Roth v. Fund of Funds, 405 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1968) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969) (section 16(b) liability exists when foreigners executed transac-
tions on United States securities exchanges); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica
Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (no jurisdiction under Regulations G and T of the
Federal Reserve Board margin rules to regulate the activities of foreign lending institutions);
United States v. Weissbredit Banca Commerciale e D'Investimenti, 325 F. Supp. 1384
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (jurisdiction upheld over Swiss bank for violation of Regulation T and
section 7 of the Exchange Act for broker/dealer conduct within the United States when a
foreign bank acts as a broker/dealer within the United States); Ufitec, S.A. v. Carter, 20 Cal,
3d 238, 571 P.2d 990, 142 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1977) (jurisdiction upheld over Swiss Bank for
violations of Regulation T for domestic conduct, since the exemption of section 30(b) of the
[Vol. 7
Securities Law
International law recognizes five bases for subject matter jurisdic-
tion: (1) the nationality principle;9 (2) the protective principle;1  (3) the
universality principle;" (4) the passive personality principle;'" and
(5) the territorial principle.'3  United States jurisdiction in transna-
Exchange Act "is determined by the activity's location rather than by the actor's nationality.
SEC v. OSEC Petroleum, S.A., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
94,915 (D.D.C. 1974) (jurisdiction upheld over foreign defendants for violation of section
13(d) of the Exchange Act when securities were registered under section 12 of the Exchange
Act); and United States v. Clark, 359 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) Uurisdiction upheld for
criminal violation of section 17(a) of the Securities Act when European investors purchased
debentures in a Netherland Antilles corporation and warrants convertible into stock traded
on the American Stock Exchange because the sale would detrimentally affect interests of
American investors). For a discussion of Roth v. Fund of Funds see Note, Jurisdiction-
Extraterritorial Application of United States Securities Laws, supra note 6, at 150.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 10 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. The nationality principle provides for a
nation's jurisdiction over the conduct of its citizens regardless of whether such conduct oc-
curs within or without its territorial boundaries.
10. Id. § 33. The protective principle permits a state to exercise jurisdiction and pre-
scribe rules of law to govern extraterritorial conduct that can threaten the state's governmen-
tal operations or national security.
11. Id. § 34. The universality principle provides that a state that has custody of a per-
son who has committed an act necessarily has the power to exercise jurisdiction over that
person.
12. Id. § 30. The passive personality principle is not recognized by the United States.
It permits a nation to exercise jurisdiction over conduct injuring its citizens, regardless of
where the injurious act occurred. See Research in International Law." Jurdiction with .Re-
spect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 445, 579 (Dickinson ed. Supp. 1935).
13. RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, at § 10. The territorial principle provides that nations
have jurisdiction to punish crimes committed within their territorial limits, regardless of the
nationality or residence of the actor. The territorial principle is further divided into two
distinct concepts: the subjective territorial principle and the objective territorial principle.
As to the subjective territorial principle, section 17 of the RESTATEIENT provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory,
whether or not such consequences are'determined by the effects of the conduct
outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its
territory.
As to the objective territorial principle, section 18 of the RESTATEiENT provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if
either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent ele-
ments of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed
legal systems, or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which
the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a
direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is
not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that
have reasonably developed legal systems.
19831
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tional securities cases has been decided almost exclusively by reference
to the territorial principle. 4
Case law development of subject matter jurisdiction in the United
States has focused on the relationship among four variables to deter-
mine whether United States courts will assert or deny jurisdiction:
(1) the nationality or residence of the plaintiff; (2) the nationality or
residence of the defendant; (3) the country in which the critical fraudu-
lent conduct occurred; and (4) the country in which the effect of the
fraudulent conduct was manifested. Neither the nationality or resi-
dence of the litigants, nor the location of the fraudulent conduct or the
country affected by the fraud can establish United States jurisdiction by
itself. A determination, however, as to whether each of the variables is
predominantly United States or foreign generally reveals if the an-
tifraud provisions should be applied. The purpose of this Article is to
propose a matrix model that uses those four variables to assist in the
determination of jurisdiction. In addition, this Article will propose a
standard nomenclature to aid that analysis.
Assuming that each variable will only be categorized as either
"United States" or "foreign," the following matrix illustrates the six-
teen possible combinations of these variables (the "jurisdictional
matrix"):
The subjective territorial principle is also known as the "conduct doctrine" and the
objective territorial principle as the "effects doctrine." Jurisdiction exists under the conduct
doctrine in the territory where the act occurred, even if the effect of the act is not manifested
within the same territory. The effects doctrine establishes jurisdiction in a territory where
conduct had a foreseeable and substantial effect, regardless of where the conduct occurred.
A finding that the territorial principle permits jurisdiction does not mean that a nation must
exercise jurisdiction-only that under international legal principles the nation has the right
and the power to exercise jurisdiction. For analysis of the territorial principle see Johnson,
supra note 6, at 903-25; Case Comment, liT v. Cornfeld, 6 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 157, 161-
65 (1980).
14. Norton, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of U.S. Antitrust and Securities Laws, 28 INT'L
& COMp. L.Q. 575, 579 (1979).
[Vol, 7
Securities Law
Nationality or Nationality Country in Country in
Residence of or Residence which Conduct which Effect
Plaintiff of Defendant Occurred Occurred
1 United States United States A. United States United States
B. United States Foreign
C. Foreign United States
D. Foreign Foreign
2 United States Foreign A. United States United States
B. United States Foreign
C. Foreign United States
D. Foreign Foreign
3 Foreign United States A. United States United States
B. United States Foreign
C. Foreign United States
D. Foreign Foreign
4 Foreign Foreign A. United States United States
B. United States Foreign
C. Foreign United States
D. Foreign Foreign
The combinations are divided into four basic groups determined by
reference to the nationality or residence of the litigants. When the
plaintiff is American, the transaction is denominated Transaction 1 if
the defendant is American, but Transaction 2 if the defendant is for-
eign. When the plaintiff is foreign, the transaction is denominated
Transaction 3 if the defendant is American, but Transaction 4 if the
defendant is foreign.
Within each Transaction group are four subgroups, established by
reference to the country in which the conduct occurs or effect of the
fraud is manifested. Thus, when the conduct and effect both occur in
the United States, the subgroup classification is A. United States con-
duct with foreign effect is B. When the conduct is foreign and the effect
is in the United States, then the subgroup classification is C. The final
classification is D, which indicates that both conduct and effect are
foreign.
A two variable code identifies which of the sixteen combinations is
involved in litigation. Transaction 3 (foreign plaintiff, United States
defendant) with a conduct/effect subgroup of B (United States conduct,
foreign effect) is known as a "3B Transaction." Use of the matrix no-
menclature specifies which of the sixteen possible transaction combina-
tions is involved.
1983]
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Transactions lA and 4D represent the extremes of the matrix. A
pure case of 1A (where plaintiff, defendant, conduct, and effect are all
American) is not a transnational situation, and does not raise the issue
of the extraterritorial application of United States law. A pure case of
4D (where plaintiff, defendant, conduct, and effect are all foreign) may
involve a transnational securities problem if the litigants, conduct, and
effect involve more than one country, but should not result in applica-
tion of United States law. Each of the remaining fourteen combina-
tions, however, may justify the exercise of jurisdiction in the United
States (and elsewhere) under international legal principles.
The thesis of this Article is that the jurisdictional sufficiency of
conduct and effect is directly related to the nationality and residence of
the litigants. In Transactions 1 and 2, where the injured party is Amer-
ican, a fraudulent transaction necessarily involves at least a modest
United States effect, although not one necessarily cognizable for pur-
poses of subject matter jurisdiction. Even a modicum of United States
conduct (beyond the statutory minimum use of the means of interstate
commerce) may be sufficient to sustain jurisdiction. Transaction 3 in-
volves injury to a foreign party by an American. Because the injured
party is foreign, the effect will generally, although not always, be for-
eign. If jurisdiction exists, it will usually be based upon the domestic
conduct of the American. Finally, in Transaction 4, where both victim
and perpetrator of the fraud are foreign, only an extraordinary showing
of United States conduct will establish jurisdiction.
Without the benefit of analysis and characterization, few transna-
tional securities transactions can be neatly or quickly identified in
terms of the matrix model. When a foreign investor purchases securi-
ties in London and meets in both London and New York with a United
States issuer, the transaction could be 3B (foreign plaintiff, United
States defendant, United States conduct, and foreign effect) or 3D (for-
eign plaintiff, United States defendant, foreign conduct, and foreign ef-
fect) since conduct occurs in both the United States and England. A
major focus of judicial inquiry lies in comparing and contrasting con-
duct and effect involving the United States and other countries and
concluding (for a variety of analytical reasons) that the conduct or ef-
fect should be characterized as either United States or foreign even
though both domestic and foreign elements are involved. The same
analysis also applies to the nationality of the real parties in interest in
the litigation where the litigant of record may be of a different national-
ity than the beneficial litigants or alter egos of the litigants. The cate-
gorization of the nationality of the litigants and the foreign or domestic
[Vol. 7
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nature of the conduct and effect, in turn, establishes the relevant stan-
dards to analyze whether jurisdiction exists.
The process by which the judiciary evaluates competing national
interests in its search for a suitable tribunal for an international dispute
is complex, fascinating, and continually evolving. The goal of the fol-
lowing discussion, which subjects existing law to a matrix analysis, is to
encourage the adoption of standard nomenclature, terminology, and
analysis by the judiciary. Uniform interpretation of the applicable
standards for subject matter jurisdiction would permit issuers to plan
international securities transactions with greater confidence, knowing
that like conduct will be governed uniformly, at least in the United
States.
II. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT OF THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
Development of the extraterritorial application of the securities
laws has been principally fashioned by the Second Circuit.' 5 Follow-
15. See IT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980) (foreign investors who purchase
securities in the United States are entitled to the protection of the federal securities laws);
Fidenas A.G. v. Compagnie Internationale Pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull S.A.,
606 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1979) (no jurisdiction where all parties were foreign and the core of the
alleged fraud occurred in Switzerland); Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171 (2d Cir.
1976) (jurisdiction upheld over broker/dealer who sold securities to an offshore mutual
fund); IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) (fraud to foreign investors results in
jurisdiction when United States conduct is material, but will not arise if domestic conduct is
"merely preparatory" to commission of the fraud); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d
974 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) (jurisdiction for international securities
transactions can exist for United States citizens and residents, nonresident United States
citizens, and foreign investors, although varying degrees of conduct are required to sustain
jurisdiction based upon the nationality and residence of the injured party); Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972) (when material misrepre-
sentations are made in the United States, jurisdiction exists even when the actual sale of
securities occurs in England); SEC v. N. Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 106
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), af'd in part and vacated in part on other groundr, 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970)
(no registration exemption for stock offering made to dealers outside the United States who
purchase with a view to redistribute the stock into the United States); Roth v. Fund of
Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968); and Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d
Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 906 (1969) (antifraud provisions apply extraterritorially when necessary to protect
United States securities exchanges, domestic securities markets, or American investors); SEC
v. Vesco, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 198,837 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (federal
securities law jurisdiction exists where many of the acts essential to the commission of the
fraud against the largely foreign investors occurred in the United States and involved sub-
stantial use of the United States mail and telephone); Fund of Funds v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 545 F. Supp. 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (jurisdiction exists where the transaction involved
1983]
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"weighty United States contacts"); Armstrong v. McAlpin, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,323 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (consideration of subject matter jurisdiction post-
poned pending further discovery); Ogdeninvest, A. G. v. Hessiche Landesbank-Girozen-
trale, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,555 (S.D.NY. 1978) (no
jurisdiction where plaintiff and defendant were foreign corporations and no allegations that
defendant committed fraudulent acts within the United States with regard to plaintiff were
made); Sun First Nat'l Bank v. Miller, 77 F.R.D. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (consideration of
subject matter jurisdiction postponed for further discovery of whether sale by English de-
fendants of a repurchase agreement backed by United States Treasury bills satisfied either
the Leasco or Bersch tests); Garner v. Enright, 71 F.R.D. 656 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (personal
jurisdiction sustained as to domestic defendants and found insufficient as to foreign defend-
ants in an action brought by the liquidators of a Bahamian bank); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v.
Vesco, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,644 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (ju-
risdiction upheld in a sale of notes between a Canadian and Costa Rican corporation where
defendants performed activities materially important to the fraud within the United States);
Venture Fund (Int'l) N.V. v. Willkie Farr & Gallagher, 418 F. Supp. 550, 556 (S.D.N,Y.
1976) (consideration of subject matter jurisdiction postponed and motion to dismiss denied
since conflicting versions of facts made it impossible to determine whether defendants' ac-
tions "were peripheral, 'merely preparatory,' or more significant."); F.O.F. Proprietary
Funds Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co., 400 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (no jurisdiction
when a Canadian corporation purchased convertible guaranteed debentures issued and
guaranteed by United States corporations but plaintiff failed to allege any culpable, rather
than merely preparatory, acts by defendant within the United States); Wagman v. Astle, 380
F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (lack of personal jurisdiction precluded consideration of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction); SEC v. Capital Growth Co., S.A. (Costa Rica), 391 F. Supp. 593
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (jurisdiction upheld in an SEC injunctive action where sales of offshore
mutual funds stressed investment in United States securities, and the use of interstate mail to
sell the funds constituted acts forming an essential part of the fraudulent activity); Seizer v,
Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., 385 F. Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (jurisdiction upheld where a
personal trust created by a Canadian citizen with a Bermuda bank for the benefit of a
United States citizen was formed to, and did, invest in American securities); United States v.
Clark, 359 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (jurisdiction upheld in a criminal indictment under
section 17(a) of the Securities Act where defendants sold debentures of a Netherlands Antil-
les corporation and warrants convertible into common stock of an American Stock Ex-
change company to European investors because a sale abroad could have a substantial
detrimental effect on American investors); Wandschneider v. Indus. Incomes Inc. of N. Am.,
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 93,422 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (jurisdiction
upheld where German nationals purchased nonvoting stock in a New York corporation that
managed a mutual fund, and the sale closed in the United States); Inv. Properties Int'l, Ltd.
v. I.O.S. Ltd., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 93,011 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (motion for preliminary injunction denied, and issue of subject matter jurisdiction
deferred, in intercompany disputes involving loans, stock in a private company, stock traded
on foreign stock exchanges sold exclusively to non-United States citizens and residents, con-
dominiums sold with a pooled rental agreement and conceded to be an investment contract,
and a pledge of securities); Manus v. The Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 93,299 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (court noted probable lack of
subject matter jurisdiction when a Canadian plaintiff sued a Bermuda bank for an allegedly
unauthorized purchase of unregistered common stock of a New York corporation and the
principal transaction occurred in England); United States v. Weisscredit Banca Commer-
ciale e D'Investimenti, 325 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Finch v. Marathon Sec. Corp.,
316 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (despite some United States involvement, no jurisdiction
when the substance of the allegedly fraudulent conduct occurred in England, the parties
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ing the seminal case of Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,t6 opinions by the
court in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Max ell,
t7 Bersch
v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. ,i 11T v. Vencap, Ltd ,t and liT x. Cornfeld °
have established a complex jurisdictional calculus for determining sub-
ject matter jurisdiction for transnational securities litigation. With the
notable exceptions of the Third Circuit's opinion in SEC P. Kasser2 l
and the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Continental Grain v. Pacific Oilseeds,
Inc. I the Third,' Fifth,24 Eighth,2s and Ninth Circuits26 have substan-
were predominantly foreign, the stock was of a foreign corporation not registered on a na-
tional securities exchange, and there was no showing of a United States injury); Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (no juris-
diction to extend sections 14(d) and (e) of the Exchange Act and Regulations G and T
promulgated under section 7 of the Exchange Act to govern loan made by German and
English lenders to finance a tender offer for a New York Stock Exchange company); Sinva,
Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 48 F.R.D. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (no
jurisdiction for commodities futures transactions made between foreigners in Europe and
executed on the London Stock Exchange); Ferraioli v. Cantor, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,615 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (no jurisdiction over a private sale in
Canada of the controlling shares of a New York Stock Exchange corporation in an isolated
transaction); and Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
16. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'don othergroundr, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc) cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
17. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
18. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
19. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
20. 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
21. 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
22. 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979).
23. See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977)
(urisdiction exists when significant conduct forming essential part of defendant's fraud to-
ward Canadian investor occurred in the United States, even with no domestic effect) and
Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3rd Cir. 1976) (jurisdiction upheld where a nonresi-
dent foreign national was defrauded by a domestic broker through a scheme conceived in
the United States and involving stock in an American corporation traded on the over-the-
counter market). For commentary on Kasser indicating the Third Circuit's departure from
the standards of the Second Circuit see Note, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the Antifratd
Provisions of the Securities Acts, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 137 (1978); Comment, Jurisdiction in
Trausnational Securities Fraud Cases-Securities and Exchange Commission it Kasser, 7
DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 279 (1978); Note, Securities Regulations-Extraterritorial4ppltca-
tion of the AntifraudProvisions, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 173 (1978); Guritzky, Transna-
tional Application ofAnti-Fraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws Expanded (SEC v.
Kasser, 3d Cir. 1977), 8 SEToN HALL L. REv. 795 (1977).
See also Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (no jurisdiction when a
Colombian plaintiff sued a foreign investment trust organized under the laws of the Bahama
Islands formed to invest in United States real estate when domestic investors were prohib-
ited from owning the securities and no domestic effect was alleged other than a generalized
statement that defendant's fraud adversely affected United States real estate type securities);
Selas of Am. (Nederland) v. Selas Corp. of Am., 365 F. Supp. 1382 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (jurisdic-
tion upheld when an American Stock Exchange company sold stock in a foreign subsidiary
to a Dutch corporation owned by employees of the subsidiary, including an American, when
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tially accepted the analytical leadership of the Second Circuit.
the agreement was reached in the United States, the allegedly fraudulent acts occurrcd in the
United States, and the result could impact on defendant's earnings, thereby causing a signifi-
cant impact on the American market); Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (jurisdiction upheld when a New York Stock Exchange company plaintiff
purchased stock in five privately owned Spanish companies, which it paid for with its com-
mon stock, and when negotiations were conducted and the stock purchase agreement exe-
cuted in the United States).
24. See United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836
(1978) (jurisdiction upheld when a domestic promoter sold fractional undivided working
interests in United States oil and gas wells to European investors and investors defrauded, in
part, in the United States). See also Garner v. Pearson, 374 F. Supp. 591 (M.D. Fla, 1974)
(jurisdiction sustained where fraudulent acts occurred in Florida, interstate mails were used,
and domestic investors were affected by a fraudulent sale of bank time deposits); Ferland v.
Orange Groves of Florida, 377 F. Supp. 690 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (jurisdiction upheld without
discussion in a class action brought by Canadian residents who purchased one-acre lots in a
Florida orange grove through the Montreal sales offices of Florida corporations); SEC v.
Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963) (jurisdiction sustained in
an SEC injunction action where Canadian citizens purchased Canadian notes issued for the
benefit of a United States corporation, but defendants used interstate mails and placed offers
in Canadian newspapers, and some of the newspapers were circulated in southern Florida
where many Canadian citizens vacation).
25. See Continental Grain Austl. Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979)
(jurisdiction upheld where an Australian company purchased all of the stock of an Austra-
lian company and a scheme of fraudulent nondisclosure was organized and completed in the
United States, even though the agreement was executed outside of the United States and
there was no effect on domestic securities markets or investors); and Travis v. Anthes Impe-
rial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973) (jurisdiction upheld when a Canadian corporation
made a tender offer for Canadian stock to Canadian residents only, United States residents
were fraudulently induced to retain their shares, and the fraudulent inducements involved
United States contacts, even though contact was primarily limited to the use of interstate
mail or telephone for communications initiated by United States citizens).
For an incisive criticism of the avowedly expansionist policy approach to securities ju-
risdiction adopted in Continental Grain and SEC v. Kasser, the Third Circuit case upon
which the Eighth Circuit relied, see Note, Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd, v. Pacific
Oilseeds, Inc.: An Unjusiflable Expansion of Subject Matter Jurisdiction in a ransnatlonal
Securities Fraud Case, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 264 (1980).
26. See Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 721 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1983) (jurisdiction upheld
when a German company purchased common stock from a Mexican company, the purchase
agreement was executed in the United States for convenience reasons, and the transaction
had no effect either on United States investors or securities markets); Des Brisay v. Goldfield
Corp., 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977) (jurisdiction upheld when an American Stock Exchange
Company paid for the stock and assets of a Canadian corporation with its own common
stock in a transaction that violated United States securities laws and caused the collapse of
the domestic market of the company, thereby adversely affecting domestic investors); and
SEC v. United Fin. Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973) (when misrepresentations and
fraudulent conduct involved interstate mails, jurisdiction was upheld even though United
States shareholders represented a tiny fraction of all shareholders). See also Ufitec v.
Carter, 20 Cal. 3d 238, 571 P.2d 990, 142 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1977).
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A. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook27
In Schoenbaum, the earliest of the major Second Circuit cases, the
court examined the basis for and limitations upon the extraterritorial
application of the federal securities laws. The court sustained jurisdic-
tion based upon the objective territorial principle, or the effects test.2"
An American shareholder of Banff Oil, Ltd., a Canadian corpora-
tion (Banff), alleged violations of Rule lOb-529 in a shareholder's deriv-
ative action. The complaint alleged that treasury shares were sold in
Canada at an artificially low price to defendants Aquitaine of Canada,
Ltd., and Paribas Corporation. Banff common stock was registered
with the SEC and traded on the Toronto and American stock
exchanges.
The court first dealt with the well-settled principles of statutory
construction which provide that American law presumptively governs
only within the territorial limits of the United States,30 unless there is
evidence of clear congressional intent to extend legislation beyond na-
tional borders.3" The Second Circuit did not cite, nor does there ap-
pear to be, any legislative history discussing the extraterritorial
application of the federal securities laws.3 2 In the absence of any ex-
27. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.),rey'don other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (cn banc),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). For discussion of the substantive securities issues involved
see Comment, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook- The 'New Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation
Law, 55 VA. L. REv. 1103 (1969).
28. 405 F.2d at 208-09.
29. 405 F.2d at 218; see17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983).
30. 405 F.2d at 206. For a fuller analysis of the presumption against the extraterritorial
application of federal law, see Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d
1326, 1335 (2d Cir. 1972).
31. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281
(1949). See also Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (United States patent law
given extraterritorial application after finding sufficient congressional intent to rebut the pre-
sumption of territoriality). See generally Grundman, The New mperialisn--The Extrateri-
torialApplication of United States Law, 14 INr'L LAw. 257 (1980); Norton, supra note 14.
32. In Bersch, decided some seven years later, the Second Circuit conceded that there
was no legislative history because Congress had not considered the problem of the extrater-
ritorial application of the securities law-
We freely acknowledge that if we were asked to point to language in the stat-
utes, or even in the legislative history, that compelled these conclusions, we would
be unable to respond. The Congress that passed these extraordinary pieces of leg-
islation in the midst of the depression could hardly have been expected to foresee
the development of offshore funds thirty years later. We recognize also that rea-
sonable men might conclude that the coverage was greater, or less, than. . . this
day decided. Our conclusions rest on case law and commentary concerning the
application of the securities laws and other statutes to situations with foreign ele-
ments and on our best judgment as to what Congress would have wished 'f these
problems had occurred to it.
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pression of congressional intent on this issue, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that Congress must have intended to apply the federal securities
laws extraterritorially when necessary to effectuate the expressed statu-
tory purposes of protecting American investors and of maintaining
"fair and honest markets" in securities transactions.33
The court next rejected the suggestion that section 30(b) 34 of the
Exchange Act reflects legislative intent to apply the securities laws
solely to domestic transactions. The court held that the only limitation
imposed thereby is to exempt from federal registration those securities
transactions conducted outside of the United States when such conduct
is part of a "business in securities. 35 Having overcome the presump-
tion against extraterritorial application of domestic law, the Second
Circuit considered the case on its merits.
Neither the trial court nor the appellate court found any domestic
conduct. The trial court similarly found no domestic effect and denied
519 F.2d at 993 (emphasis added).
33. 405 F.2d at 206. The Second Circuit additionally relied on Strassheim v, Daily, 221
U.S. 280, 285 (1911), where the Supreme Court held that:
Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimen-
tal effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if [the
actor] had been present at the [time of the detrimental] effect, if the State should
succeed in getting him within its power.
Strassheim represents an early acceptance of the effects doctrine. Since the effects doctrine
frequently is employed when the actor is outside the jurisdiction where the effects doctrine is
jurisdictionally appropriate, its use may serve to overcome the presumption against extrater-
ritorial application precisely because the doctrine inherently contemplates extraterritorial
application of domestic law.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b). The section provides that:
The provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not
apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the
jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such business in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter.
Section 30(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer, directly or indirectly, to
make use of the mails or of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce
for the purpose of effecting on an exchange not within or subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States . . .in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate. . . to prevent the evasion
of this chapter.
The implications of section 30 to the extraterritorial application of the federal securities
laws are also discussed in Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F,2d at
1336. For a detailed analysis of section 30(b), see Goldman & Magrino, Some Foreign As-
pects of Securities Regulation: Towards a Reevaluation of Section 30(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of1934, 55 VA. L. REV. 1015 (1969); Toth, Registration andRegulation of Foreign
Securities Businesses, 12 INT'L LAW. 159 (1978).
35. 405 F.2d at 207.
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jurisdiction.3 6 The Second Circuit, however, held that there was signif-
icant United States effect and therefore granted jurisdiction 7.3  The
contrary jurisdictional conclusions result primarily from different per-
ceptions of which matrix combination was involved.
The trial court regarded the American shareholder as standing in
the litigation shoes of Banff.38 Since Banff was a foreign corporation,
the transaction was 4D. Plaintiff and defendant were foreign, the
fraudulent sale occurred in Canada, and the effect of the fraud, if any,
was manifested upon the Canadian corporation. All four variables
were foreign and subject matter jurisdiction did not exist.
The Second Circuit disregarded the derivative characteristics of
the suit and focused instead on the actual parties to the litigation. The
plaintiff was an American, the defendant was foreign, and the sale oc-
curred in Canada. The fraudulent sale adversely affected both the for-
eign corporation and its American shareholders, as well as the integrity
of the American securities markets upon which Banff's shares were
traded. Therefore, the effect could be classified as domestic since there
was at least as much of a domestic as a foreign effect. Identification of
the true party in interest as the American shareholder rather than the
Canadian corporation affected both the base group designation of
plaintiffs nationality (2 versus 4) and the subgroup classification of the
location of the effect (C versus D). As viewed by the appellate court
the transaction was 2C, and jurisdiction existed.
The court concluded that Congress intended the Exchange Act to
apply extraterritorially to "protect domestic investors who have
purchased foreign securities on American exchanges!' 39 and also to pro-
tect "the domestic securities market from the effects of improper for-
eign transactions in American securities."'' The decision established a
minimum standard for application of United States federal securities
laws to international transactions. If the actual injured party is Ameri-
can, if the transaction adversely affects domestic securities markets, and
if the affected security is registered on a national securities exchange,
then applying the securities laws extraterritorially is consonant with
congressional intent and international law.4
36. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
37. 405 F.2d at 208-09.
38. 268 F. Supp. at 390.
39. 405 F.2d at 206.
40. Id.
41. In the words of the court:
the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over violations of the Securities
Exchange Act although the transactions which are alleged to violate the Act take
19831
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Schoenbaum illustrates the importance of the matrix as an analyti-
cal mode and the significant differences that arise from characterizing
any individual variable as United States or foreign. When jurisdiction
is sought solely on the basis of the effects doctrine, many transactions
would support jurisdiction if Party.A sues Party B, but will not sustain
jurisdiction if Party B sues Party. for fraudulent conduct arising from
the same situation. As an example, although there is jurisdiction for a
lawsuit by a Banff shareholder as a 2C transaction, the matrix shows
that a reversal of litigation roles falls into a different category. Thus, if
Aquitaine sued Banff alleging that Aquitaine had overpaid for the
treasury shares in a sale occurring in Canada induced by inadequate
disclosure, the litigation would have involved a foreign plaintiff (Aqui-
taine), a foreign defendant (Banff), foreign conduct (Canadian sale),
and foreign effect (injury to Aquitaine). The transaction would be
characterized as 4D, with the result of no jurisdiction.
If the Second Circuit's analysis in Schoenbaum is used for the
same example and the court looks through Banff as defendant to
Banff's United States shareholders as defendants, then the transaction
must be recharacterized. Under this analysis the plaintiff (Aquitaine)
and the conduct (Canadian sale) are foreign and the defendants
(Banfi's United States shareholders) are domestic. The effect, however,
is that the United States defendants are enriched by the fraudulent con-
duct. Since the effect is not adverse to United States interests, the effect
is not classifiable as domestic but is designated as foreign (le., not
United States). The transaction is 3D and does not result in jurisdic-
tion. When the nationality of plaintiff and defendant are reversed the
base group classification changes-in this example from Transaction 2
to Transaction 3. For transactions where jurisdiction exists only pursu-
ant to the effects doctrine, this will inevitably have the consequence of
eliminating jurisdiction.
B. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell42
In Leasco the Second Circuit circumscribed the holding in
Schoenbaum, thereby narrowing the application of the effects test. The
place outside the United States, at least when the transactions involve stock registered
and listed on a national securities exchange, and are detrimental to the interests of
American investors.
Id. at 208 (emphasis added).
42. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972). See Note, ExtraterritorialApplicatlon of Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, 34 Omo ST. L.J. 342 (1973).
[Vol. 7
Securities Law
court, however, granted jurisdiction based on the conduct test and clar-
ified the parameters of the subjective territorial principle.
A British corporation, Pergamon Press Limited (Pergamon), per-
suaded an American corporation, Leasco Data Processing Equipment
Corporation (Leasco), to purchase shares of Pergamon traded on the
London Stock Exchange. The purchase was ultimately made by
Leasco's wholly-owned Netherlands Antilles subsidiary (Leasco N.V.),
which subsequently sued Pergamon for violation of Rule l0b-5.
3
Leasco alleged that the purchase was induced by misrepresentations
which were communicated by mail and telephone, and in person, and
which occurred in the United States and England."
The defendants encouraged the court to engage in a stringent ef-
fects test, and analyze the transaction based on the nationality of the
named litigants.45 Viewed from this perspective, the plaintiff was
Leasco N.V. (foreign), the defendant was Pergamon, a British corpora-
tion (foreign), the effect was suffered by Leasco N.V. (foreign), and the
fraudulent conduct was the sale of shares in England (foreign). De-
fendants argued that there should be no extraterritorial application of
Rule lOb-5 when a foreign investor buys a security of a foreign issuer
not registered with the SEC and the sale occurs abroad.46 This concurs
with a matrix analysis that when aU four matrix variables are foreign,
then the transaction is 4D and there is no United States jurisdiction.
Consideration of whether benefit of the federal securities laws is avail-
able to foreign investors was deferred, however, because Leasco N.V.
was ultimately "accepted by both sides as the alter ego of the Ameri-
can. ' 47 As a result of the foregoing analysis, the Second Circuit ana-
lyzed jurisdiction as if the litigation involved a domestic plaintiff and a
foreign defendant. The threshold determination, therefore, was that
the base group of the case was Transaction 2, and the remaining issue
was whether the subclassification was A, B, C, or D.
43. Technically, Leasco sued Pergamon. When defendants properly objected that with-
out Leasco N.V. as a party to the litigation there was no actual purchaser of securities and
therefore no party with standing to allege violations of Rule lOb-5, plaintiff's counsel stipu-
lated that the complaint would be amended to join Leasco N.V. as party plaintiff. 468 F.2d
at 1337.
44. Id at 1331.
45. Id at 1335.
46. Id. at 1336.
47. Id. at 1338. Judge Friendly, on behalf of the court, specifically did not decide what
effect, if any, would result when a United States citizen deliberately purchased securities in a
foreign country through a foreign entity. "Whatever may be the rule where the defrauded
American investor chooses, deliberately and unilaterally, to have the purchase consum-
mated abroad by a foreigner, here the situation was quite different." Id.
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Injury was incurred by an American corporation (Leasco) and its
domestic shareholders. Since the fraudulent sale was to an American,
the minimum standards of international law under the objective terri-
torial principle for adverse domestic effect would have been satisfied
provided that the adverse effect was intended by the wrongdoer. The
danger with such an analysis is that jurisdiction would lie under the
effects test in favor of a corporation whose shares were registered with
the SEC no matter where the fraudulent transaction occurred and with-
out regard to the relative interests of competing national forum. 8 This
expansionist approach was rejected and the Schoenbaum holding nar-
rowed. The Second Circuit held that absent a minimum amount of
United States conduct, jurisdiction cannot arise based solely upon the
effects doctrine when the effects are limited to those of the instant
case.
49
It is imperative to note that the court did not deny that there was
some adverse United States effect. The injury to an American plaintiff
(Transactions 1 or 2), however, when considered in terms of the legisla-
tive intent to protect United States securities markets, was too indirect
and attenuated to be designated as domestic effect." The characteriza-
tion of effect as foreign represents an abbreviated analysis that the
American effect is not substantial or direct enough to be designated as
domestic, rather than a conclusion that there is no United States effect.
Leasco therefore involves either Transaction 2B or 2D, of which only
Transaction 2B results in jurisdiction.
Although jurisdiction was not supportable based solely upon the
effects test, jurisdiction could result from sufficient United States con-
duct. Leasco and Pergamon held several key meetings in the United
states and material misrepresentations were communicated in, and to,
48. As the Second Circuit framed the limitation:
If all the misrepresentations here alleged had occurred in England, we would
entertain most serious doubt whether, despite. . . Schoenbaum, § 10(b) would be
applicable simply because of the adverse effect of the fraudulently induced
purchases in England of securities of an English corporation, not traded in an or-
ganized American securities market, upon an American corporation whose stock is
listed on the New York Stock Exchange and its shareholders. . . . [The language
of § 10(b). . . is much too inconclusive to lead us to believe that Congress meant
to impose rules governing conduct throughout the world in every instance where
an American company bought or sold a security. When no fraud has been prac-
ticed in this country and the purchase or sale has not been made here, we would be






the United States."1 That amount of conduct, by itself, is sufficient to
satisfy the minimum standards under international law for jurisdiction
under the subjective territorial principle. 52 The level of United States
conduct additionally distinguishes Schoenbaum from Leasco, since
Schoenbaum involved wholly foreign conduct. The issue persists, how-
ever, whether Congress intended to apply its laws extraterritorially to
the full limits permitted by international law. Even where interna-
tional standards have been satisfied, the federal courts must still choose
to assert jurisdiction to effectuate congressional policy and the purposes
of the federal securities laws.
53
The court rejected the conduct analysis provided for by a conflict
of laws approach. 4 Under the analogous conflict of laws provisions, a
wrong (or fraud) occurs where "the last event necessary to make an
actor liable for an alleged tort takes place."5 5 Using the conflict of laws
theory, the conduct in Leasco would be designated as foreign because
the purchase of shares was ultimately executed in England. Using ma-
trix nomenclature and a conflict of laws approach, the Leasco transac-
tion is 2D (domestic plaintiff, foreign defendant, foreign conduct, and
foreign effect) which would not sustain United States jurisdiction.
Instead, the Second Circuit held that jurisdiction premised upon a
conduct analysis should be determined by a comparison of domestic
and foreign conduct. The roles that United States and foreign conduct
played in the fraud must be contrasted, and the sequence, location,
quantity, and quality of the fraudulent conduct considered. Fraud and
misrepresentation require a more "extensive and sophisticated analy-
sis' '56 than that provided by the conflict of laws principles. The opinion
emphasized that the location of the execution of the transaction, the
London Stock Exchange, is less determinative analytically than the
mosaic of fraudulent conduct and misrepresentations that induced the
foreign purchase. 57 Because substantial misrepresentations were made
in the United States, which significantly affected Leasco's decision to
51. Id. at 1335.
52. Id.
53. As Judge Friendly stated the issue: "Up to this point we have established only that,
because of the extensive acts alleged to have been performed in the United States, considera-
tions of foreign relations laws do not preclude our reading § 10(b) as applicable here. The
question remains whether we should." Id.
54. Id. at 1337.
55. REsTATEMENT OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
56. 468 F.2d at 1337. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws § 148
(1971).
57. 468 F.2d at 1337.
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purchase the Pergamon shares, the defendant's conduct should be des-
ignated as United States conduct for jurisdictional determinations.58
Employing the Second Circuit's standards, Leasco is a 2B transaction
(domestic plaintiff, foreign defendant, domestic conduct, and foreign
effect) for which jurisdiction lies.
Leasco revealed the delicate policy considerations involved when
securities sales transcend national borders. The Herculean task of the
judiciary is to examine the total conduct and effect in the United States
and other nations and assess the relative impact to the several nations
involved. When substantial fraud-inducing conduct occurs in the
United States and the injured party is American, Leasco indicates that
the conduct should be classified as domestic and lead to jurisdiction.
C. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. 9
Bersch and its companion case, I[T v. Vencap, Ltd ,"o were mile-
stone cases that examined several matrix combinations and directly re-
sponded for the first time to the applicable jurisdictional standards
governing foreign plaintiffs. Bersch enunciated cascading standards for
the conduct test-requiring less United States conduct to sustain juris-
58. The Second Circuit stated that:
It was understood from the outset that all the transactions would be executed in
England. Still we must ask ourselves whether, if Congress had thought about the
point, it would not have wished to protect an American investor if a foreigner
comes to the United States and fraudulently induces him to purchase foreign secur-
ities abroad-a purpose which its words can fairly be held to embrace. While as
earlier stated, we doubt that impact on an American company and its shareholders
would suffice to make the statute applicable if the misconduct had occurred solely
in England, we think it tiPs the scales infavor of applicability when substantial misrep.
resentations were made in the United States.
Id. (emphasis added).
59. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). For commentary on
the Bersch case see Note, Securities-Second Circuit Clarifies the Extraterritorial Application
of American Securities Laws, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 674 (1975); Comment, Securities
Regulation-Securities Fraud-Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 28 VAND. L. Rav. 1382
(1975); Comment, Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Transnational Security Fraud Cases, 17 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 413 (1976); Tenney, Securities, 42 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 1197, 1209-34
(1976); Note, Securities Law Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Transnational Securities Fraud, 9
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 113 (1976); Comment, Securities Regulation--Subject Matter
Jurisdiction Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 11 TEx. INT'L L.J. 173 (1976);
Comment, Extraterritorial Application of§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934-The
Implications of Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. and IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 33 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 397 (1976); and Casenote, Securities Law-Extraterritorial Applicabilty ofthe Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 997 (1976).
60. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); see Recent Cases, Extraterritorial Application of United




diction in favor of a resident American plaintiff than for a nonresident
American, and less United States conduct to sustain jurisdiction in
favor of either a resident or nonresident American plaintiff than any
foreign investor.6 Unlike prior opinions, Bersch specifically distin-
guishes transactions by reference to the nationality or residence of the
litigants, and delineates alternative jurisdictional standards based upon
classifications corresponding to the matrix transaction classifications. 62
The Second Circuit's holding in Bersch, more notably than in any other
case, demonstrates the necessity for, the sophistication of, and the limi-
tations upon, the jurisdictional matrix as an analytical aid.
The litigation stemmed from three simultaneous common stock of-
ferings made by the group of foreign companies headed by I.O.S. Ltd.
(IOS)63 and its organizer, Bernard Cornfeld.6 The largest offering was
a primary distribution underwritten by the Drexel group6 5 exclusively
to foreign nationals residing abroad (the Primary Offering). One sec-
ondary offering was conducted wholly within Canada66 and an addi-
tional secondary offering was made by an IOS subsidiary and was
limited to foreign investors with longstanding relationships with IOS
(the Overseas Offering).67
The three offerings, although technically independent, had com-
mon elements, including substantially identical prospectuses.6" All fi-
nancial statements were prepared by defendant Arthur Andersen & Co.
None of the stock was to be registered on an American stock exchange.
Finally, numerous offering activities occurred in the United States, in-
61. 519 F.2d at 992.
62. Id. at 993.
63. IOS was an international financial service organization which sold and managed
mutual funds. During 1975 as many as fifteen IOS related cases were pending in the fcderal
court for the Southern District of New York. Note, Secuities Law-Subject Mfatter Juifrdic-
tion in Transnational Securities Fraud, 9 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 113, 113 n.2 (1976).
64. For full discussions of the intrigue behind this international financier and successful
con man see B. CANTOR, THE BERNIE CORNFELD STORY (1970); and C. RAW, B. PAGE & G.
HODGSON, Do You SINCERELY WANT TO BE RiCu?: THE FULL STORY OF BERNARD
CORNFELD AND IOS (1971).
65. The Drexel Group consisted of two United States investment firms, Drexel Fire-
stone, Inc. and Smith Barney & Co., and four foreign investment firms whose principal
offices were outside of the United States: Banque Rothschild, Hill Samuel & Co. Limited,
Guinness Mahon & Co. Limited, and Pierson Heldring & Pierson. 519 F.2d at 979.
66. Id. at 980.
67. The prospectus for both the primary and overseas offerings stated that the shares
"are not being offered in the United States of America or any of its territories or possessions
or any area subject to its jurisdiction" Id.
68. Id.
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cluding meetings of lawyers, accountants, and underwriters. 69
Following a brief stabilization period, the shares quickly became
worthless. Although the shares were to be sold only to foreign inves-
tors, a United States citizen, Howard Bersch, purchased some of the
securities in the Overseas Offering and subsequently brought a class
action on behalf of investors in all three offerings.70 Because the offer-
ings were intended exclusively for foreign investors, the overwhelming
majority of members of the alleged class were citizens and residents of
Europe, Asia, and South America.
Based upon the extensive domestic conduct related to the fraud by
way of legal, accounting, and underwriting activity, the Second Circuit
was satisfied that the threshold jurisdiction standards of international
law under the subjective territorial principle had been satisfied.7' A
finding that the minimum standards have been met, however, is only a
predicate for further analysis. Defendants were potentially subject to
litigation in several countries. Each potential tribunal had a nexus to
the fraud, different legal standards for liability and damages, and
unique domestic policy reasons for asserting or denying jurisdiction.
Furthermore, a class action purporting to bind unnamed and unname-
able foreign investors might not bind either the class or defendants.72
These twin procedural problems, as well as a reluctance to expand the
aegis of United States law, may explain the court's restrictive jurisdic-
tional analysis. While not insensitive to the rights of foreign investors
to have access to United States law and the federal court system, the
holding nonetheless recognizes that Congress did not intend to unnec-
essarily extend the federal securities laws over predominantly foreign
transactions.73
The court established jurisdictional standards predicated upon the
69. Id. at 985 n. 4.
70. Id. at 981.
71. Id. at 992.
72. Affidavits introduced indicated that a judgment in favor of defendants would not
bar subsequent litigation in at least five European countries. This "near certainty" that a
foreign court would not recognize or enforce a United States judgment led the Court to
dismiss from the class action all purchasers who were not United States citizens or residents.
Id. at 996.
73. The court stated:
When, as here, a court is confronted with transactions that on any view are
predominantly foreign, it must seek to determine whether Congress would have
wished the precious resources of United States courts and law enforcement agen-




nationality74 and residence of the litigants, and then on the quantity
and quality of domestic conduct and effect." As the number of foreign
variables increases for matrix purposes, there must be a concomitant
increase in the amount of United States conduct and in its causal nexus
with the fraud before conduct can be classified as United States
conduct.
The Second Circuit held:
[T]hat the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws:
(1) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resi-
dent in the United States whether or not acts (or culpable failures to
act) of material importance occurred in this country; and
(2) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resi-
dent abroad if, but only if, acts (or culpable failures to act) of mate-
rial importance in the United States have significantly contributed
thereto; but
(3) Do not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners
outside the United States unless acts (or culpable failures to act)
within the United States directly caused such losses.
76
When the plaintiff is a United States citizen and resident, then
neither the nationality of the defendant nor the country of the conduct
is relevant, provided that the statutory minimum conduct required to
invoke the protection of the federal securities laws has been satisfied.
The fraudulent sale necessarily has a direct, domestic effect on Ameri-
can investors. In terms of the matrix, subject matter jurisdiction there-
fore exists for transactions IA, IC, 2A, and 2C.
When the plaintiff is a United States citizen but a foreign resident,
a fraudulent sale causes no cognizable domestic effect. Although there
is clearly an adverse effect to the individual investor, there is no effect
to American investors as a class nor to domestic securities markets. Ju-
risdiction, accordingly, is less easily obtained and arises only if a "ma-
terially importan[t]" act "significantly contribut[ing]" to the fraud
74. Refusal to find subject matter jurisdiction as to an alien when jurisdiction would
exist for an American may constitute a denial of due process under the equal protection
guarantee of the fifth amendment of the Constitution. See Case Comment, supra note 13, at
170; Note, Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Transnational Securities Fraud Cases, 17 B.C. IN-
DUs. & COM. L. Rv. 413, 433 (1976); Note, American Adjudication of Transnatlonal Securi-
ties Fraud, 89 HARv. L. REV. 553, 569 (1976). See also Comment, The TransnationalReach
ofRule 10b-5, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1363, 1376-77 (1973).
75. Different standards may apply in actions seeking equitable relief. 519 F.2d at 986
n.26, 988.
76. Id. at 993.
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occurred in the United States.7 7 Thus, the analysis switches from the
effects doctrine to the conduct doctrine, solely because of the difference
in residence, but not nationality, of the plaintiff. In terms of the matrix,
only Transactions 1A, 1B, 2A, or 2B sustain jurisdiction for a nonresi-
dent American.
When a foreigner purchases a security outside of the United
States, subject matter jurisdiction exists only when the sales are classifi-
able for matrix purposes as 3A, 3B, 4A, or 4B. Jurisdiction requires
both material United States conduct and a direct causal relationship
between the United States acts and the foreign loss. A fraudulent sale
to a foreign investor causes no loss to domestic investors, and therefore
no cognizable adverse American effect.
78
Bersch established a dynamic continuum for the jurisdictional ad-
equacy of conduct and effect. There are different standards for denom-
inating a transaction as involving United States conduct and therefore
falling into A or C for matrix purposes for Transactions 1, 2, 3, and 4,
and different standards within Transactions 1 and 2 depending upon
the residence of the United States plaintiff. An American resident
plaintiff (Transaction 1 or 2) must establish only the statutory mini-
mum required under the federal securities laws in order to sustain ju-
risdiction. A nonresident American seeking United States jurisdiction
(also Transaction 1 or 2) must demonstrate "materially important"
United States conduct which "significantly" contributed to the fraud.
Both the amount of conduct and its relationship to the fraud represent
more stringent standards than required of the United States resident.
A foreign investor who purchases a security abroad (Transaction 3 or
4) must establish significant domestic conduct and satisfy a stricter
causal relationship than an American plaintiff. Jurisdiction results for
77. Id.
78. It is possible, however unlikely, that the sale of certain securities to foreign investors
could impair the reputation, integrity, or liquidity of the American securities markets,
thereby justifying jurisdiction under the effects test. Where fraudulent conduct occurred
abroad, the effects doctrine will support jurisdiction only as to those purchasers or sellers of
securities "in whom the United States has an interest." A general allegation that domestic
investors, or the economy, have sustained adverse effects is insufficient as a jurisdictional
predicate. In Bersch, plaintiffs alleged broad, adverse effects upon the American securities
markets resulting from the precipitous collapse of the price of the 1OS shares. The financial
debacle deteriorated investor confidence in American underwriters and securities generally
and diminished interest in offshore mutual funds which invested in domestic securities.
While the court agreed that the failure of 1OS had an "unfortunate financial effect" in the
United States, the effect was of such a diffuse and generalized nature that it, by itself, could
not justify jurisdiction as to foreign plaintiffs. Id. at 988.
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a foreign plaintiff only if the domestic act "directly" caused the loss.79
Thus, as the relationship of the plaintiff to the United States changes
from American citizen and resident, to nonresident American, to for-
eigner, the standards required for United States conduct to suffice as a
jurisdictional predicate increase.
The critical analysis in Bersch is whether an act (or culpable fail-
ure to act) of material importance30 occurred in the United States. The
Second Circuit's analysis reflects a division of fraudulent conduct into
acts of preparation and acts of perpetration, consistent with the subse-
quent use of such terms by the Second Circuit in Vencap. The distinc-
tion would appear to be that acts of preparation are those which
position the actor to commit the fraudulent act while acts of perpetra-
tion are those which constitute the fraudulent act itself: the sale, the
misrepresentation, or the failure to disclose.
The preparation/perpetration dichotomy distinguishes the caliber
of domestic conduct required to sustain jurisdiction for a nonresident
American plaintiff in contrast to a foreign plaintiff. "While merely pre-
paratory activities in the United States are not enough to trigger appli-
cation of the securities laws for injury to foreigners located abroad,
they are sufficient when the injury is to Americans so resident."8'
In Bersch, domestic conduct involved legal, accounting, under-
writing, and financing activity.8 2 The court held that such acts were
merely preparatory to the offering work performed in Europe. The
majority of the offering work, including all final preparation of materi-
als, was performed abroad. The fraud occurred when the misleading
prospectus, the final production of which occurred overseas for all
three offerings, was delivered to the purchasers.13 Thus, no fraud oc-
curred in the United States and no jurisdiction arose.
If this distinction is applied literally, then a fraudulent securities
sale made by a domestic issuer to roommates in Paris, one a French
79. The court expressly reserved judgment on subject matter jurisdiction when losses to
foreigners resulted from sales made to them within the United States. Thus, Bersch does not
answer whether jurisdiction exists as to 3B or 4B transactions. Id. at 988 n.31.
80. The utility of the concept of an "act of material importance" is significantly dimin-
ished because the term is used nowhere else in the BersA opinion. Elsewhere, conduct is
categorized by the litigants and the court variously as: "certain United States activity," "ac-
tivity," "preliminary," "ancillary," "final form of culpable nonfeasance," "action and inac-
tion," "essential," and "significant." The failure to employ consistent terminology renders
the opinion unnecessarily ambiguous.
81. 519 F.2d at 992.
82. Id. at 985 n.24.
83. Id. at 987.
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citizen and the other a United States citizen, where domestic conduct
was "merely preparatory," results in no United States jurisdiction for
the foreign investor but jurisdiction for the nonresident American. If a
fraudulent sale occurs in France, without United States effect, the
transaction is either subclassification B or D since the transaction in-
volves foreign effect and either domestic or foreign conduct. For the
nonresident American plaintiff, merely preparatory activity is adequate
to classify the transaction as B, while for the foreign roommate the
transaction would be a D transaction. B transactions support jurisdic-
tion while D transactions do not. While such a result may be viewed
with dismay for those proponents of expansive United States jurisdic-
tion, the result is practical. The French roommate will have jurisdic-
tion in France and can pursue remedies under French law. The
American can pursue litigation in either France or the United States.
While the perpetration/preparation dichotomy has analytical ap-
peal, it also has inherent dangers. The distinction may induce courts to
buttress conclusions by merely labelling behavior by reference to the
dichotomy rather than analyzing behavior meticulously. The dichot-
omy, like the matrix itself, is a beginning rather than an end to analysis.
D. 11T v. Vencap, Ltd"
In Vencap the court could not establish the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction because the trial court's factual findings were in-
complete." The opinion, however, confirms three major principles for
the extraterritorial application of United States securities law. First,
the nationality principle, as an independent jurisdictional base, will not
sustain federal jurisdiction. Second, jurisdiction will normally be de-
cided based upon the nationality of an entity rather than its owners,
unless analysis of the owner's nationality reveals a compelling reason
to the contrary. Third, the preparation/perpetration dichotomy enun-
ciated in Bersch expresses the cardinal distinction for granting or deny-
ing jurisdiction over foreign investors based upon the subjective
territorial principle.86
Several foreign entities and Richard Pistell, a nonresident Ameri-
can, were sued for an alleged fraud in connection with the sale of secur-
ities of Vencap Limited (Vencap), a Bahamian venture capital firm.
IIT, a Luxembourg investment trust, invested $3,000,000 in Vencap af-
84. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
85. Id. at 1004.
86. Id. at 1018.
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ter meetings held in London, the Bahamas, and the United States.
Purchase documents and a Memorandum of Understanding were
drafted and reviewed in the Bahamas and New York, and the actual
purchase closed in the Bahamas. Plaintiffs" alleged that Pistell then
improperly obtained funds from Vencap.
Plaintiffs urged that United States jurisdiction should result from
the American citizenship of defendant Pistell. The Second Circuit,
however, repudiated the nationality principle as an independent juris-
dictional basis for violations of the federal securities acts. The court
held that the United States had no jurisdiction over the actions of its
nationals abroad, unless there was a relationship between those actions
and either domestic conduct or effect.
8
8
If the nationality principle formed the basis of United States juris-
dictional law, then one-half of the matrix would be unnecessary. The
United States nationality of defendant would be outcome-dispositive
and result in United States jurisdiction for Transactions 1 and 3, each
of which involves American defendants. Only Transactions 2 and 4
would remain subject to analysis. Because the court rejected the na-
tionality principle as being independently determinative, a defendant's
nationality remains only a single factor which, in conjunction with
other matrix variables, shapes the governing jurisdiction standards for
a particular transaction.
The Second Circuit then concluded that jurisdiction could not
arise under the effects test when there was no "significant effect in the
United States."8 9 The immediate effect of the fraud in Vencap was
upon IIT, a foreign investor. Plaintiffs urged the court to adopt a
"pierce-the-corporate-nationality" test to consider the adverse effect re-
sulting from the fraud upon IIT's American shareholders. The over-
whelming majority (99.5%) of IIT's shareholders, however, were
foreign.90 The court held that when the effect is so predominately for-
eign, then it is inadequate to sustain U.S. jurisdiction.91 For matrix
87. The litigation was brought by IIT and three citizens of Luxembourg appointed by
the District Court of Luxembourg as the liquidators of IIT. Id. at 1003.
88. Id. at 1016. Judge Friendly, on behalf of the court, stated that "It is simply
unimaginable that Congress would have wished the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws to apply if, for example, Pistell while in London had done all the acts here charged and
had defrauded only European investors." Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Judge Friendly stated the issue as follows:
And even though Schoenbaum does not necessarily set the outmost reaches for
subject matter jurisdiction with respect to foreign activities having effect within the
United States, the losses from this S3,000,000 investment to these 300 American
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purposes, this relative propotion of foreign versus domestic effect indi-
cates that the proper subclassification is D and not B.
The remaining issue was whether domestic activity was sufficiently
material to sustain jurisdiction under the conduct test. United States
conduct consisted primarily of reviewing and drafting agreements in
New York. The factual record, however, was unclear as to the relative
significance of the drafting and negotiating in New York compared
with the preparatory conduct in the Bahamas and elsewhere. Because
both the Bersch and Vencap opinions stress the distinctions between
acts of preparation and perpetration, it is imperative that the factual
record fully reflect all of the foreign and domestic conduct. The court
emphasized the importance of ascertaining the "exact means by which
an alleged fraud has been accomplished ... ."
The court held that the perpetration/preparation dichotomy gov-
erns all defendants, domestic as well as foreign. 93 While the demarca-
tion may be artificial, the Second Circuit felt that discriminations must
exist or the United States would resolve every dispute tangentially in-
volving domestic conduct, without regard to the impact of the activity
on the United States or its citizens.94
Translated into matrix terminology, the Vencap holding indicates
that both Transactions 3B and 4B give rise to jurisdiction, while Trans-
actions 3D and 4D do not. In order for domestic conduct in transac-
investors, owning only some .5% of a foreign investment trust which reported net
assets of $263,000,000 as of December 31, 1971, and the shares of which apparently
were not intended to be offered to American residents or citizens, is not the "sub-
stantial" effect within the territory of which the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law § 18(b)(ii) speaks.
Id. at 1017.
92. Id. at 1009.
93. For a trenchant analysis of Judge Friendly's approach in Bersch and Vencap, partic-
ularly critical of the preparation/perpetration dichotomy see Note, supra note 63, at 135-36.
94. In the words of the court:
We do not think that Congress intended to allow the United States to be used
as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these
are peddled only to foreigners. . . .Our ruling on this basis of jurisdiction is lim-
ited to the perpetration of fraudulent acts themselves and does not extend to mere
preparatory activities or the failure to prevent fraudulent acts where the bulk of the
activity was performed in foreign countries, such as in Bersch. Admittedly the
distinction is a fine one. But the position we are taking here itself extends the
application of the securities laws to transnational transactions beyond prior deci-
sions and the line has to be drawn somewhere if the securities laws are not to apply
in every instance where something has happened in the United States, however
large the gap between the something and the consummated fraud and however
negligible the effect in the United States or on its citizens.
519 F.2d at 1018.
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tions 3 and 4 to be subclassified as B, the activity must constitute the
actual perpetration of the fraud. Preparatory activities, no matter how
extensive or material to the commission of the fraud, will not serve as a
basis for jurisdiction.
While these distinctions may appear harsh and unnecessarily re-
strictive to the foreign investor, they reflect a sensitivity to the differ-
ences between the conduct and effects tests as bases for jurisdiction.
When foreign investors are injured, the United States customarily suf-
fers no adverse effect. Federal jurisdiction, therefore, can only arise
from application of the conduct test. The nation where the defrauded
foreign investor resides, however, has probably sustained an adverse
effect because of the injury to its citizen and may assert effects-based
jurisdiction. Depending upon the facts, the nation may also assert ju-
risdiction under the conduct test. Because injury to foreign investors
involves an alternative (and probably more convenient) forum with
substantial nexus to the fraud, access to United States courts is less
important. The applicable standards for granting United States juris-
diction to foreign investors should, therefore, be more stringent than
that for injured American investors. By establishing a higher standard,
the federal judiciary will avoid duplicating jurisdiction.
The preparation/perpetration dichotomy is somewhat contrived
and difficult to apply. It possesses the virtue, however, of limiting the
reach of American law and permitting other nations to exercise juris-
diction over transnational securities transactions. The value of using a
matrix analysis, in conjunction with the dichotomy, is that the appro-
priate legal standard for the sufficiency of conduct and effect is imme-
diately apparent. The higher standards for conduct and effect as
jurisdictional predicates for Transactions 3 and 4 implicitly acknowl-
edges that other nations may appropriately exercise jurisdiction over
those transactions. Because of that recognition, the test enunciated in
Vencap for balancing the relative importance of domestic to foreign
conduct and effect represents a subtle, but sophisticated, method of
weighing the interests of competing international forums. As the inter-
ests of other nations become predominant and the probability increases
that another country will exercise jurisdiction over the transaction, ap-
plication of the Second Circuit's test makes it increasingly improbable
that the United States will exercise jurisdiction.
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E. it v. Cornfeld 95
In the most recent major Second Circuit case, Cornfeld, the court
granted jurisdiction even though the litigation involved "substantial
foreign elements. 96 The opinion illuminates the Bersch holding and
introduces several new concepts to the jurisdictional analysis.
Cornfeld was yet another case involving the IOS group. The alleg-
edly injured party, as in Vencap, was IIT which was managed by a
Luxembourg company, IIT Management Company S.A., an IOS affili-
ate. The liquidators of IIT brought a shareholders' derivative action
alleging that the purchase of securities in companies controlled by
an American, John King, constituted an attempt by IOS and IIT Man-
agement Company to defraud IIT and its predominantly foreign
shareholders. 97
The plaintiffs alleged that several American companies were prin-
cipals, aiders, or abettors of the fraud in their respective roles as bro-
kers, accountants, or underwriters.98 Arthur Lipper and Arthur Lipper
Corp. (collectively, "Lipper") were charged as principals, aiders, and
abettors for their role in facilitating the purchase of securities. The in-
ternational accounting firm of Arthur Andersen & Co. and several
American underwriters were charged as aiders and abettors for their
respective roles in preparing inadequate financial statements appearing
in the offering circulars and of selling the securities.99
Fraud was charged in connection with three separate securities
transactions effected by various King companies. IIT purchased
subordinated convertible debentures (Debenture Purchase) issued by a
Netherlands Antilles corporation, King Resources Capital Corpora-
tion, N.V. (Netherlands Antilles Subsidiary), a wholly-owned subsidi-
ary of King Resources Company (King). King was an American
corporation whose shares were traded publicly in the United States.
The debentures were guaranteed by King and were convertible into
King's common stock. The purchase was made in the Eurodollar
95. 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980). See Recent Decisions, Transnational Reach o/Federal
Securities Laws-Federal Courts Lack Jurisdiction Over Rule lOb-3 Claims Brought by
Foreigners where the Alleged Deception Occurs Abroad, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 935 (1980).
96. 619 F.2d at 912.
97. As of the date of litigation, IT had 218 shareholders residing in the United States of
whom an unknown number were citizens. Of a total of 144,496 fundholders in 154 coun-
tries, approximately 1/8 of 1% were American. Id. at 913.
98. John King and his companies were not named as parties defendant because protec-
tive stays were issued by the courts handling their respective bankruptcy proceedings. Id. at
914.
99. Id. at 915.
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aftermarket following a foreign offering conducted virtually simultane-
ously with a domestic offering of King debentures100
lIT's second acquisition was a substantial purchase of King's com-
mon stock (Stock Purchase). The Stock Purchase was handled by Lip-
per as the broker and the securities were bought in the United States
over-the-counter market.101
The last of the ill-fated transactions was the purchase of a convert-
ible note (Private Note Purchase) from The Colorado corporation, a
private company largely owned by John King. The purchase of the
Private Note was consummated in the United States. 0 2
The appellate court identified the real parties in interest differently
than the trial court. The district court focused on the derivative nature
of the claim and concluded that where foreign management defrauded
a foreign investment trust whose fundholders were foreign, and Ameri-
cans merely aided and abetted such fraud, then the actual fraud and
deception were necessarily committed outside of the United States. 03
Thus viewed, Cornfeld is a 4D transaction (foreign plaintiffs, defend-
ant, conduct, and effect) which does not give rise to jurisdiction.
The Second Circuit regarded the predominantly foreign
fundholders as the real parties in interest, and the American aiders and
abettors as the true defendants. 10° This alteration converts the action
from foreign shareholders suing foreign management (Transaction 4)
to foreign shareholders suing American defendants (Transaction 3).
This emphasis results in a different base group classification with lower
standards for the jurisdictional sufficiency of domestic conduct. It also
results in a different analysis of what fraudulent conduct was involved,
where it occurred, its materiality, and its causal relationship to the
fraud.
Both the district and appellate courts agreed that the transactions
involved injury primarily to foreign parties (whether to predominantly
foreign shareholders or to the foreign corporation). 0 5  Mere genera-
lized adverse effects resulting to the domestic securities market were
100. Id. at 914. IT also alleged that it purchased S50,000 of the subordinated deben-
tures in the United States. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 918.
103. Id. at 914. The District Court concluded that "[s]ince virtually all the fundholdcrs
were foreign nationals residing in foreign countries, the deception, if it could be proved,
must have occurred outside of the United States." IT v. Comfeld, 462 F. Supp. 209, 224
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
104. 619 F.2d at 918.
105. 462 F. Supp. at 223; 619 F.2d at 917.
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therefore insufficient to sustain jurisdiction under the effects test. 10 6
The Second Circuit, however, identified a new variable which may in-
fluence the existence of jurisdiction-the nationality of the issuer. Al-
though there is no legislative history to support this position, the court
posited that Congress would more willingly extend American law to
govern securities fraudulently sold by domestic, rather than foreign,
issuers. 107
The court then analyzed the three transactions by reference to the
conduct test and concluded that jurisdiction existed over each of
them."0 ' Treating the case as if plaintiffs were shareholders defrauded
by American principals, aiders, and abettors (Transaction 3), the Stock
Purchase and Private Note Purchase easily sustained United States ju-
risdiction. The Debenture Purchase, however, yielded jurisdiction only
after thoughtful and creative analysis, which relies heavily on the juris-
dictional relevance of the issuer's nationality. 10 9
The Stock Purchase and the Private Note Purchase are 3B transac-
tions. Foreign plaintiffs sue United States defendants, and although
there is no cognizable domestic effect, conduct critical to the fraud
(preparation of the prospectus and sale of the security) occurred in the
106. 619 F.2d at 917.
107. In the words of the Second Circuit:
We think Congress would have been considerably more interested in assuring
against the fraudulent issuance of securities constituting obligations of American
rather than purely foreign business. Our statement in Vencap, &s60ra, 519 F.2d at
1017: "We do not think Congress intended to allow the United States to be used as
a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these
are peddled only to foreigners" applies with even greater force when, as here, tile
securities are essentially American. Our very next sentence, id., "This country
would surely look askance if one of our neighbors stood by silently and permitted
misrepresented securities to be poured into the United States" reads with particular
strength on a situation where the securities are essentially of the pourer's own na-
tionals. . . . None of this amounts to saying that if fraud had been committed in
the United States in connection with the issuance of the debentures, American
courts would look away.
Id at 920.
Although it is by no means certain, one interpretation of this judicial thesis is that when
an American security is fraudulently sold, even though there is no direct effect on domestic
investors or markets, there is an indirect and undesirable impact upon the integrity of the
domestic system. While the impact, without more, is neither necessary nor sufficient to sus-
tain jurisdiction, a court may be influenced to accept jurisdiction over the fraudulent sale of
United States securities where the same matrix combination of plaintiff, defendant, conduct,
and effect would not result in jurisdiction when the security is foreign. Rather than modify-
ing the matrix base groups, this position establishes specific criteria for subgroup classifica-
tion involving the effects test.




United States. If foreigners buy securities in the United States, they
may be protected by the federal securities laws, an issue left unresolved
in Bersch.110 Foreigners who purchase securities in the United States
do not, however, automatically gain access to the federal court system,
even when the security is issued by a domestic issuer. When both fac-
tors occur concurrently, however, they are strong predicates for
jurisdiction."'
A United States purchase of a security by a foreigner does not
necessarily confer jurisdiction. Transactions 3A, 3B, 4A, and 4B poten-
tially involve a United States sale. In 3A and 3B, where the defendant
is American, the sale alone should be sufficient to sustain jurisdiction
regardless of whether the sale is effected privately or on a securities
exchange. Personal jurisdiction can be obtained in the United States
over the defendant, and possibly nowhere else. No matter what con-
duct may have occurred elsewhere, the fact that the sale occurred do-
mestically should suffice for jurisdiction as to a United States
defendant.
Transactions 4A and 4B, however, in which a foreign plaintiff sues
a foreign defendant for a fraudulent securities sale effected in the
United States, may not support jurisdiction, a conclusion reached in
Leasco and elsewhere. 112 An adverse American effect is unlikely in
Transaction 4. A private sale between foreign parties cannot directly
affect the market or American investors, involves no domestic effect,
and cannot be classified as 4A. If the fraud involves securities traded
on a domestic exchange, the sale may adversely affect domestic markets
or investors, although this is highly unlikely. If so, a sale effected on
the stock exchange could be classified as 4A. As a practical matter,
however, Transaction 4A is unlikely to occur.
Jurisdiction under Transaction 4 will normally exist only for
Transaction 4B and will result from the commission of acts of perpetra-
tion committed within the United States, when the United States is de-
110. The court stated that "[n]one of our cases or any others intimate that foreigners
engaging in security purchases in the United States are not entitled to the protection of the
anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws." Id at 918. The court specifically left this issue
undecided in Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993.
111. The Second Circuit sensibly avoided establishing an overly facile "litmus test"
while recognizing the usual importance of these tactors:
Hence we do not mean to suggest that either the American nationality of the issuer
or consummation of the transaction in the United States is either a necessary or a
sufficient factor, ... but rather that the presence of both these factors points
strongly toward applying the anti-fraud provisions of our securities laws.
619 F.2d at 918.
112. For a discussion of Leasco see supra text accompanying notes 42-58.
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liberately chosen as the location of the sale by the perpetrator of the
fraud and when the location materially assists the commission of the
fraud. When two foreigners close a transaction in New York merely
for convenience and no other domestic conduct is involved, then the
relationship of the fraud and the foreign parties is insufficient to sustain
jurisdiction.
1 1 3
Analysis of the Debenture Purchase involves complex jurisdic-
tional issues. The debentures were sold in Europe to foreign investors.
Thus, in accordance with Bersch, no federal jurisdiction should arise
unless acts (or culpable failures to act) within the United States were
the direct cause of the losses.
The fraudulent securities, although nominally foreign, were char-
acterized by the court as American. First, the foreign subsidiaries' de-
bentures were offered simultaneously with a significant United States
offering of King debentures. The debenture offering was an "integral
part" 14 of the American stock financing, in contrast to Bersch in which
the simultaneous offerings were all foreign. Because the American and
foreign offerings were interrelated, they could be integrated. There-
fore, the Debenture Purchase was analyzed as involving American fi-
nancing. Second, although the debentures were direct obligations of
the subsidiary, their issuance depended entirely upon the financial via-
bility of the parent American corporation. The subsidiary had no oper-
ating assets and the debentures were saleable only because they were
convertible into King's common stock and guaranteed by King.1"5
Thus, purchasers made investment decisions based upon the American
guarantor rather than the foreign issuer. Under those circumstances,
the debentures are characterized as domestic obligations. These dis-
tinctions serve to differentiate the securities in Bersch from those in
Cornfeld.
The salient analysis, however, is whether United States conduct in
the Debenture Purchase was merely preparatory to the fraud or consti-
tuted an act of perpetration. That differentiation necessitates an exami-
nation of the quantity and materiality of United States conduct by itself
and then a comparison of such conduct to the corresponding foreign
113. InLeasco, the Second Circuit posited that a sale between foreigners effected in the
United States where the closing location was merely a matter of convenience rather than the
situs of negotiation would not give rise to subject matter jurisdiction. Judge Friendly's anal-
ysis was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir.
1983). See supra note 26.




conduct, if any." 6 The lead underwriter of the Eurodollar offering was
American, the allegedly fraudulent prospectus was drafted entirely in
the United States, and all of the allegedly improper accounting work
was performed domestically. All fraudulent activity, with the excep-
tion of the actual sale, was effected domestically. The role of American
conduct in Cornfeld contrasts sharply to Bersch, in which American
conduct was prior to, and less material than, its counterpart European
conduct.
Employing this conduct analysis, the Second Circuit found that
although the United States activities in Bersch resemble those in
Cornfeld, "the relativity is entirely different because of the lack here of
the foreign activity so dominant in Bersch .. ."I" Thus, even the
identical amount and nature of domestic conduct does not determine if
the subclassification is B or D. Because several nations have a legiti-
mate jurisdictional interest in the transaction, the importance of the
United States conduct must be assessed in relation to foreign
conduct. " I
Although Bersch and Cornfeld involve many similar jurisdictional
variables (foreign plaintiff, domestic defendant, purchases abroad, and
effect abroad), the Second Circuit successfully distinguishes the cases.
Because the conduct of the fraud was both domestic and foreign, either
transaction could be identified as 3B or 3D. Whereas in Bersch the
domestic conduct was preparatory and the foreign conduct was the fi-
nal and critical conduct, the preparatory domestic conduct in Cornfeld
had no foreign counterpart and was consequently the sole and direct
cause of the loss. Through this relativistic conduct analysis, Bersch
emerges as a 3D transaction which will not sustain jurisdiction while
Cornfeld is a 3B transaction supporting jurisdiction.
III. CONCLUSION
The jurisdictional tests developed by the Second Circuit have been
116. As the court stated. "Determination whether American activities 'directly' caused
losses to foreigners depends not only on how much was done in the United States but also
on how much (here how little) was done abroad." Id. at 920-21.
117. Id. at 920.
118. While the court observes that the other countries where aspects of the fraud oc-
curred or had an effect might have an interest in the litigation, it concludes that since the
United States antifraud statutes are as strict or stricter than comparable provisions of the
laws of other nations, those countries would not be disturbed by application of American
law. Id. It is doubtful, however, that the court would have reached a different conclusion if
American law were less strict than competing foreign law, or that it would have suggested
that jurisdiction should rest exclusively with the country with the highest standards.
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criticized as rationalistic and insensitive to transnational policy consid-
erations." 9 This criticism is misplaced. 'Although the opinions may
not be explicitly responsive to the competing interests of other fo-
rums,120 the decisions make sophisticated and subtle distinctions based
on the nationality of the litigants and the countries affected by the
fraud which implicitly accommodate the competing interests of poten-
tial forums. The Second Circuit tests represent a statesmanlike ap-
proach to the problem of extraterritorial application of the federal
securities laws.
The matrix proposed in this Article is a tool which clarifies the
variables involved in the jurisdictional analysis and the different legal
standards which are used when a court has identified which matrix
combination is involved. Recognition of the matrix and adoption of a
standard nomenclature for discussion and analysis will encourage more
uniform analysis and development of the principles for subject matter
jurisdiction of transnational securities transactions.
119. For an article highly critical of the Second Circuit's failure to consider the compet-
ing interest and balancing test suggested by section 40 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES see Note, supra note 63, at 139-46,
120. Section 40 of the RESTATEMENT provides:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the
rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person,
each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating
the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement
actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of
the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably
be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 40.
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